Claude Data Loss Prevention
Redact sensitive data in every Claude prompt - claude.ai web, the desktop apps, the Anthropic API, and Claude Code. In-flight redaction, zero workflow change.
14-day free trial, no credit card.
Review this Postgres connection string for issues: postgresql://arjun:SuperSecret@123[REDACTED_CREDENTIALS_1]@db.devops-corp.io:5432/production - also our SSH key is `ssh-ed25519 AAAA...[REDACTED_CREDENTIALS_2]` for arjun[REDACTED_PERSONAL_INFO_1].[email protected].
What leaks to Claude - and why
The four exfiltration patterns we see most often when teams adopt Claude.
Long context windows attract long pastes
Claude's 200k+ context window invites users to paste whole tickets, threads, log files, and code reviews. The more context, the more leaked secrets per prompt.
Claude Code routes full source files to Anthropic
Claude Code reads files in your repo and sends them as context. `.env`, credentials in test fixtures, customer data in seed scripts - all of it goes upstream by default.
Artifacts and tool-use loops echo your inputs back
When Claude renders a tool call (search, code execution, computer use), your original prompt text travels with each step. A naive DLP that only inspects the first request misses the rest.
Internal docs in long-form 'help me write this' prompts
Claude is the favourite for long-form writing, which means employees paste internal docs - strategy memos, draft contracts, customer briefs - and ask for a polish. The first draft is the leak.
What Claude actually sees, with NexusNest in front
The user types whatever they want. NexusNest redacts the sensitive spans in-flight, so the prompt that reaches Anthropic has placeholders in place of the secrets.
Review this Postgres connection string for issues: postgresql://arjun:SuperSecret@[email protected]:5432/production - also our SSH key is `ssh-ed25519 AAAA...` for [email protected].
Review this Postgres connection string for issues: postgresql://arjun:[REDACTED_CREDENTIALS_1]@db.devops-corp.io:5432/production - also our SSH key is `[REDACTED_CREDENTIALS_2]` for [REDACTED_PERSONAL_INFO_1].
Set up in 2 minutes
Install the agent
Download the .pkg / .exe and double-click. The agent installs a local trusted CA and the system proxy - no IT ticket required for Claude traffic to flow through it.
Open your AI tool as normal
Use Claude exactly the way you do today - browser, desktop app, or API. The agent intercepts the outgoing request, runs the redaction pipeline, and forwards a redacted version.
Watch the dashboard
Every prompt shows up in the admin dashboard with what was redacted, by which employee, on which machine. Claude usage becomes legible.
Claude DLP - common questions
Does it work with Claude Code in the terminal?
Yes. Claude Code's traffic to Anthropic is intercepted the same way as the desktop app and the user-authored content in each message is redacted before it reaches Anthropic.
What about claude.ai's Projects feature?
Project knowledge bases are file uploads; NexusNest does not modify uploaded files. What is redacted is anything the user types or pastes into the prompt box of a Project conversation.
Does NexusNest cover Claude on the Anthropic Workbench?
Yes - Workbench prompts go to the same Anthropic API the desktop app and Claude Code use, so they're covered out of the box.
Will the redaction break Claude's tool-use / computer use?
No. The placeholder tokens flow through tool calls as opaque strings. Claude treats `[REDACTED_PERSONAL_INFO_1]` as a reference label and responds normally.
How is this different from Anthropic's enterprise data protections?
Anthropic's enterprise plan adds zero data retention and SOC2 audit access. It does not redact what users paste. NexusNest removes the sensitive content before it ever reaches Anthropic, so retention policies are a backup, not your only line of defence.
Stop sensitive data leaking to Claude today
Deploy on every employee laptop in under 10 minutes. 14-day free trial. No credit card required.