Cursor Data Loss Prevention

Redact sensitive content in every Cursor prompt and inline completion. Covers Cmd-K, Cmd-L chat, agent mode, and the full file context.

Cursor on macOSWindowsLinuxincluding Cmd-KCmd-L chatagent modeinline completions

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prompt - intercepted by NexusNest
Refactor this to use our prod DB: const conn = 'postgresql://arjun:[REDACTED_CREDENTIALS_1]@db.devops-corp.io:5432/production'; const adminEmail = '[REDACTED_PERSONAL_INFO_1]';
Delivered to Cursor. Secrets redacted, 0 leaked. Originals never stored.
DetectRedactDeliver

What leaks to Cursor - and why

The four exfiltration patterns we see most often when teams adopt Cursor.

Full files become model context

Cursor sends the entire open file (and often surrounding files) as context for Cmd-K and chat. Anything in those files - credentials in fixtures, customer data in seeds - is exfiltrated by default.

Agent mode reads and edits across the repo

Cursor's agent walks files autonomously to complete a task. It can read your entire `.env`, internal docs, and credentials without you explicitly attaching them.

Provider routing varies by user

Cursor proxies to OpenAI, Anthropic, and its own models depending on settings. Per-provider DLP misses this; NexusNest intercepts at the Cursor → model boundary regardless of which model is selected.

Composer accumulates context across turns

Each Composer turn ships the conversation history back. A credential pasted in turn 1 is re-sent in turn 5 even if the user thought they'd moved on.

What Cursor actually sees, with NexusNest in front

The user types whatever they want. NexusNest redacts the sensitive spans in-flight, so the prompt that reaches Cursor has placeholders in place of the secrets.

What the user types
Refactor this to use our prod DB: const conn = 'postgresql://arjun:SuperSecret@[email protected]:5432/production'; const adminEmail = '[email protected]';
What Cursor sees
Refactor this to use our prod DB: const conn = 'postgresql://arjun:[REDACTED_CREDENTIALS_1]@db.devops-corp.io:5432/production'; const adminEmail = '[REDACTED_PERSONAL_INFO_1]';

Set up in 2 minutes

1

Install the agent

Download the .pkg / .exe and double-click. The agent installs a local trusted CA and the system proxy - no IT ticket required for Cursor traffic to flow through it.

2

Open your AI tool as normal

Use Cursor exactly the way you do today - browser, desktop app, or API. The agent intercepts the outgoing request, runs the redaction pipeline, and forwards a redacted version.

3

Watch the dashboard

Every prompt shows up in the admin dashboard with what was redacted, by which employee, on which machine. Cursor usage becomes legible.

Cursor DLP - common questions

Does the redaction work with Cursor's agent mode?

Yes. Each model call from the agent goes through the same intercept layer; we redact both the user prompt and the assembled file context.

Does this work if Cursor is routing to my own OpenAI / Anthropic API key?

Yes - we match the destination domain, not the API key holder. Whether Cursor is using its own credits or your bring-your-own-key, the prompt is intercepted on the way out.

Will my completions get worse?

For prompts that didn't contain sensitive data, nothing changes. For prompts that did, the model sees placeholders in place of the sensitive spans. Completions usually come back correctly shaped - the developer fills the real value back in at edit time.

Does Cursor's privacy mode already do this?

Cursor's privacy mode prevents your prompts from being used for training and adds zero-day retention with their model providers. It does not redact the content of your prompts. NexusNest removes sensitive content before any provider sees it.

Does this slow down Cmd-K?

Adds ~150–250 ms typically - well under the threshold where it feels disruptive. Most of that is the redaction detection round-trip.

Stop sensitive data leaking to Cursor today

Deploy on every employee laptop in under 10 minutes. 14-day free trial. No credit card required.